This paper provides a rationale for the use of discretion in bank loan contracts. Discretion allows banks which produce information on borrowers to optimally adapt contract terms to 'soft' or non-verifiable information in the course of lending. This facilitates investment efficiency and also allows for wealth redistributions in favor of firms with good investment opportunities. I show that the optimality of discretion depends critically on bank quality and the degree of lender competition. If bank quality is low and/or lender competition is limited, enforceable bank contracts and financial market contracts dominate discretionary contracts. I also show that the relative importance of bank vis-à-vis financial market financing is nonmonotonic in borrower quality. The analysis has implications for the competitive position and the optimal organizational structure of banks, and emphasizes the value of relationship lending in an increasingly competitive environment.
Introduction
Financial contracts are often incomplete in the sense that they fail to legally bind in at least some states, thereby leaving contractual discretion (i.e., flexibility) with the contracting parties.
While this incompleteness may result from technical constraints (contracting on all possible states in the economy may either be too complex or too costly), the use of discretion in financial contracts may also be deliberate. That is, even if enforceable contracts can be written on a specific set of states, contracting parties may prefer not to do so and to leave contractual conditions unspecified.
In this paper, I provide a rationale for the use of discretionary contracts in relationship lending. I argue that discretion in bank contracts allows banks which produce information on borrowers to optimally condition their lending terms on non-verifiable (i.e., 'soft') information obtained from monitoring. This facilitates intermediate interest rate adjustments that may enhance investment efficiency on the side of the firm, and also allow for an optimal wealth redistribution in favor of firms with good investment opportunities. I examine under which conditions the use of discretionary contracts by banks is credible, and analyze the link between a firm's funding source choice, borrower quality, bank quality and lender competition.
The intuition developed in this paper is as follows. Consider a firm which seeks long-term debt financing for an investment project by either approaching a bank or by obtaining funding in the financial market. Banks invest in costly information production, and in the course of lending receive non-verifiable (and thus non-contractible) information with respect to the firm's investment opportunities. Financial market financing might now be at a disadvantage; not conditioning on this soft information may give the wrong price signal to the firm, and may adversely affect the firm's real decisions. In particular, the adverse selection premium in the pooled funding cost with financial market financing can give rise to asset substitution moral hazard.
Bank financing may prevent this investment inefficiency, since a bank can lower the interest rate for a firm with good investment opportunities. That is, bank financing is valuable because it allows a bank to steer incentives by 'tailoring' lending terms to soft information obtained from monitoring. The bank's flexibility in doing so depends on the type of bank contract offered.
While interest rate reductions are always feasible, interest rate increases are not, unless the bank reserves the right to do so. The latter would be the case with discretionary (non-binding) contracts. The terms of enforceable (binding) contracts cannot be worsened. Enforceable bank contracts therefore only allow for downward interest rate adjustments by a bank in order to enhance investment efficiency. Discretionary contracts, on the other hand, allow for interest rate adjustments in both directions, and thus enable banks to better discriminate between firms with good and bad investment opportunities in customizing their lending terms. The resulting wealth redistribution favors good firms, and enhances the benefits stemming from investment efficiency. This makes bank financing more attractive.
The main insights of the paper are as follows. The optimality of discretionary contracts depends critically on both bank quality and the degree of interim lender competition. A key result is that lender competition is necessary for the viability of discretionary bank financing.
The reason is that discretionary contracts subject firms to large hold-up problems which may deteriorate the investment efficiency of borrowers. This is particularly acute when competition is missing. That is, the degree of rent extraction in the absence of competition is such that it is not worthwhile for banks to bring lending rates down to the level that facilitates investment efficiency. Competition curbs the bank's ability to extract rents, and could make it attractive for the bank to charge even lower rates to enhance investment efficiency. Competition thus facilitates discretionary contracts. The value of discretionary contracts also increases with the quality of a bank as an information producer. High quality banks can optimally tailor lending terms, which makes discretionary contracts superior to enforceable bank contracts and financial market contracts.
The hold-up problem is also a key determinant of the firm's funding source choice. I show that both the benefits of discretion and the severity of the hold-up problem vary with borrower quality. As a result, the relative importance of bank financing vis-à-vis financial market financing is non-monotonic in borrower quality. Except for the very worst borrowers, bank financing is optimal if the quality of the borrower pool is low. In the presence of lender competition (and thus, a relatively small hold-up problem), firms then choose discretionary contracts if the quality of the bank is sufficiently high. Otherwise, firms choose enforceable bank contracts. Provided that competition contains the hold-up problem, discretionary bank financing can also be attractive for a high quality borrower pool, with the exception of the very best borrowers, which choose financial market financing. If the borrower pool is of medium quality, the hold-up problem associated with discretionary bank financing may drive firms to the financial market.
These results have implications for the competitive position of banks. It has often been argued that the traditional comparative advantages of banks in relationship lending have been eroded due to increased competition in the banking sector and the proliferation of financial markets. Competition might therefore destabilize bank-firm relationships, and result in a loss of market share by banks (see, e.g., Chan et al., 1986, and Rajan, 1995) . The analysis in this paper shows that this assertion is not necessarily true. Bank financing may continue to be optimal in a more competitive environment. The reason is that discretionary contracting may increase if competition increases. The importance of bank quality, however, suggests that only higher quality banks can credibly derive added value from relationship lending.
The analysis has several empirical implications. First, it emphasizes the importance of specialization (i.e., a focus on relationship lending vis-à-vis transaction lending) by banks in the presence of competition. Higher quality banks have a comparative advantage in offering discretionary bank contracts, but are also more competitive in offering enforceable contracts.
More reputable banks therefore can insulate themselves from pure price competition (and thus, lower profit margins) by focusing on relationship banking, since they can fully customize their contracts based on their expertise and competitive edge in exploiting soft information. In line with other work (see Thakor, 2000, and Hauswald and Marquez, 2002) , this points at a lasting value of financial intermediation. Surprisingly, however, this requires sufficient competition in the financial sector, as well as sufficient bank quality.
Second, although competition is crucial for the feasibility of discretionary contracting, other developments need to be controlled for as well. In a recent paper, Berger et al. (2001) show that smaller (decentralized) banks are better in collecting and using soft information on potential borrowers than larger (centralized) banks which rely more on verifiable firm characteristics (see also Stein, 2002) . The current trend of consolidation in the banking sector, which appears to go hand in hand with increased competition, may therefore undermine the possibility for banks to produce and effectively utilize soft information. This raises the question whether consolidation is an optimal response to increased competition, since it makes discretionary contracting more difficult. As suggested in this paper, herein lies substantial added value.
Finally, the analysis suggests that the contract terms of loans made to borrowers in bankfirm relationships may either improve or deteriorate over time, dependent on the quality of the borrower pool and the types of bank contracts considered. This may explain some of the mixed evidence on the impact of relationship lending on the pricing of bank loans (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994 , Berger and Udell, 1995 , and Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000 , and suggests that these factors need to be taken into account in interpreting the results of empirical work. This paper links to a large literature on financial contracting. Von Thadden (1995) also addresses the issue of optimal contract design in bank-firm relationships, and provides a rationale for long-term lines of credit with a termination clause. The intuition is that such contracts increase a borrower's investment horizon, while at the same time allowing for efficient liquidation of bad projects and mitigating bank hold-up problems. That is, banks have the option to unilaterally deny credit to borrowers, but if they extend credit, they do so at prespecified terms (see also Houston and Venkataraman, 1994) . Whereas in Von Thadden (1995) banks have flexibility in terminating lending to borrowers, the contractual discretion in this paper serves as an 'implicit' price mechanism that banks can use to customize long-term contracts to nonverifiable information. 1 This allows for an explicit analysis of the impact of lender competition.
Another related paper is Berlin and Mester (1992) , which focuses on the value of restrictive loan covenants as a mechanism to trigger renegotiations between banks and firms. Their argument is that the presence of strict covenants in bank loans reduces agency problems, but allows a bank to relax such covenants selectively when they impose an inefficient constraint. The bank contracts in Berlin and Mester (1992) resemble the enforceable bank contracts in this paper, but depend by definition on verifiable information. In this paper, I focus on the incremental value of bank discretion in the pricing of loans based on non-verifiable information, and also allow for a wealth redistribution between borrowers.
A second group of related papers addresses the benefits and drawbacks of bank-firm relationships. Petersen and Rajan (1995) and Allen and Gale (1997) focus on the benefits of intertemporal subsidies (see also Berlin and Mester, 1999) , and show that the possibility of banks and firms to intertemporally share surplus during a long-term relationship is value-enhancing. Petersen and Rajan (1995) furthermore argue that competition mitigates the benefits of intertemporal smoothing, and may result in a lower availability of financing to younger and credit-constrained firms. Although this paper concentrates on loan pricing instead of loan availability, intertemporal subsidies are central as well, since the benefits from relationship-lending in the model accrue to firms through a lower first-period interest rate. The use of discretionary contracts augments these subsidies with a cross-sectional wealth redistribution between firms. Furthermore, since borrowers are informationally captured, competition does not eliminate the possibility for such intertemporal transfers in loan pricing, but instead is necessary to prevent excessive rent extraction with discretionary contracts. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) also highlight the hold-up problem which arises from a bank's informational monopoly and its impact on loan pricing and investment efficiency in the course of the relationship. This paper shows that the severity of this hold-up problem depends on the type of bank contract used, and furthermore varies with bank quality and borrower quality. Finally, recent papers on bank-firm relationships analyze the impact of interbank competition and financial market competition on a bank's strategic allocation of resources between relationship lending and transaction lending activities (Boot and Thakor, 2000) , a bank's incentives to specialize in relationship lending in a core market (Hauswald and Marquez, 2002) , and a bank's reputational incentives to honor commitments to provide financing to high quality firms (Dinç, 2000) . While these contributions study how each type of competition affects a bank's incentives to invest in relationship banking, the focus in this paper is on how banks can optimize the benefits of relationship lending given a certain allocation of resources through their contract choice.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal model. Section 3 contains the preliminary analysis and examines the firm's investment decision under different financing alternatives. Section 4 analyzes the firm's contract and funding source choice in the absence and in the presence of discretionary bank contracts, and presents the main results of the paper. Section 5 discusses extensions and further implications of the analysis. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
The Model

Production Possibilities for Firms
Consider a two-period model with universal risk neutrality. The economy consists of firms which need $1 of external debt financing in order to invest in a project. The riskfree interest rate is assumed to be zero. The quality of the projects available to the firms is random. With a probability θ ∈ [0, 1] a firm has both a lower risk ('safe') and a higher risk ('risky') project available, with a probability (1 − θ) the firm has only a higher risk project. Both projects have a positive expected NPV, however, the safe project has a higher expected NPV than the risky project. Investment in either project generates a cash flow C > 0 at the end of the first period which is sufficient for the firm to make the first-period's interest payments. 2 Excess cash at this date is consumed by the firm, and thus cannot be used for second-period debt payments or early loan repayment. In the second period, the safe project yields a cash flow of Y with a probability η ∈ (0, 1), and 0 with a probability (1 − η). The risky project yields a cash flow of X with a probability α ∈ (0, 1), and 0 with a probability (1 − α). Project cash flows are non-observable, but partially verifiable. That is, lenders can verify whether a project's cash flow is sufficiently high to make debt payments, however, they cannot infer the firm's project choice. I assume that α < η, ηY > αX and X > η 2 Y α(2η−α) > Y > 1/α. A firm therefore wants to invest in the case of outside financing, and for firms with a project choice investing in the safe project is first best efficient.
Whether a firm has a project choice or is locked in to the risky project is known only to the firm. Each firm is characterized by an observable parameter θ, which represents the commonly known prior probability that a randomly selected borrower will have access to a safe and a risky project. 3 Denote a firm with a project choice as type G, and a firm with only a risky project as type B. A type G firm's project choice is unobservable. Later on, the parametric conditions will be set such that a type G firm prefers to invest in the safe project with external financing at the riskfree rate and the full information rate for the safe project, respectively. With outside financing at a pooled fixed rate, however, a type G firm may choose to invest in the risky project. This is how asset substitution moral hazard will arise in the model.
Types of Contracts and Funding Sources
Each firm in the economy needs to finance its project externally through either bank or financial market financing. I focus on long-term (two-period) debt contracts. 4 Banks invest in information production (i.e., monitoring) after contracting, and receive a noisy signal with respect to the firm's investment opportunity set at the end of the first period. There is a potential friction associated with bank financing (due to regulatory costs, information production costs, etc.).
This friction is introduced as a monitoring cost M , with M ≥ 0. The signal received by a bank is non-verifiable by third parties, and therefore can not be contracted upon. That is, information with respect to the quality of a firm's investment opportunities is assumed to be 'soft', and thus cannot be credibly communicated to outsiders (see, e.g., Stein, 2002) . 5 This assumption can be justified by the fact that not all information regarding a firm's investment prospects is verifiable. Indeed, the availability and success probability of investment projects often depends significantly on factors other than those that can be unambiguously interpreted from a business plan. It is this type of soft information that is central in the model. Banks can acquire such information on their borrowers only by lending, which is consistent with empirical evidence (see James, 1987, and Lummer and McConnell, 1989) . The noisiness of the signal received by a bank depends on the bank's quality γ ∈ [0, 1], where γ represents the probability with which the bank receives a perfectly informative signal with respect to the firm's type. High quality banks can be expected to receive a more precise signal from monitoring than low quality banks, and thus are characterized by a higher γ. With a probability (1 − γ) the bank receives an uninformative signal and learns nothing about the firm's investment opportunities. The bank's investment in information production is assumed to be exogenous. 6 All banks in the economy have the same quality parameter γ, which is commonly known. 7
Dependent on the signal received and the type of bank contract used, a bank may adjust the interest rate of the loan at the end of the first period. Two types of bank contracts can be distinguished: enforceable (binding) contracts and discretionary (non-binding) contracts. The terms of enforceable bank contracts are explicitly specified in the contract, and can be enforced by court. Enforceable contracts therefore do not allow a bank to worsen the firm's lending terms in the course of lending by increasing the prespecified interest rate. However, these contracts do allow for interest rate decreases. Discretionary contracts, on the other hand, do not prespecify the lending terms for the second period, and thus do not legally bind. These contracts can be viewed as implicit commitments which leave residual discretion for bilateral contracting with the contracting parties. With discretionary contracts, a bank can either increase or decrease the interest rate in the course of lending.
5 Observe that strategic considerations may prevent a firm from disclosing private information with respect to its investment opportunities to outsiders, even if it could do so (see, e.g., Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995) .
6 Observe that it is only in the bank's interest to produce information if bank contracts are renegotiable, i.e., if the bank can act upon this information (see Berlin and Mester, 1992) . Endogenizing the bank's information production decision will yield similar results for sufficiently small levels of M . In that case, loans for which the bank invests in monitoring can be characterized as relationship-loans, and loans for which the bank does not invest in monitoring can be characterized as transaction loans (these loans are equivalent to financial market contracts).
7 The parameter γ can be interpreted as the quality of the banking industry (see also Section 5.3). Considering different γ's (i.e., heterogeneity in bank quality) is beyond the scope of this paper.
Information production in the financial market is subject to free-rider problems (see, e.g., Diamond, 1984) . In the case of financial market financing, therefore, no information production will take place, and as a consequence, no intermediate interest rate adjustments will occur.
Financial market contracts thus can be characterized as enforceable contracts with equal coupon payments in each period. Rajan (1992) , I distinguish two cases:
1. No Competition; in this case, the firm is locked in to its incumbent ('inside') bank for some exogenous reason.
2. Pure Price Competition; in this case, outside lenders compete with the inside bank by offering (short-term) contracts to the firm at the end of the first period.
Interim competition by outside lenders may be absent due to bank collusion (i.e., banks may have agreed not to poach each other's clients in a particular market), lack of development of financial markets, non-callability of bank loan contracts, or government intervention and regulation. Observe that, even in the presence of outside lenders at the intermediate date, competition is limited by the existence of asymmetric information between the inside bank and outside lenders (see later).
Sequence of Events in Lender-Borrower Interaction
The sequence of events in the model is as follows. At t = 0, nature determines the project availability for each firm in the economy, which then becomes known to the firm. Banks and lenders in the financial market observe the quality parameter θ of a firm seeking debt financing, and simultaneously offer contract terms. The firm subsequently chooses both contract type and funding source and invests. At t = 1, the first-period's cash flow C is realized and first-period interest payments are made. In the case of bank financing, the bank which lent to the firm in the first period receives a signal with respect to the firm's investment opportunity set and chooses the second-period interest rate. A firm with a project choice then makes its ultimate project decision. 8 At t = 2, second-period project cash flows are realized, and repayments are made if possible. Then the game ends. In the absence of lender competition at t = 1, this sequence of events describes the whole game. When lender competition is present, this structure is extended with a bidding game between the inside bank and outside lenders at t = 1 (see Section 3). 
Determination of Benchmark Interest Rates
Let r * be the interest factor (i.e., 1 + the interest rate) for which a type G firm is indifferent between choosing the safe and the risky project in the case of external financing. Then, r * solves:
The interest rate structure in equation (1) implies that a firm pays equal coupon interest in each period and repays the debt at the end of the game. 9
In a competitive credit market, the terms on the loan are set to yield the lender an expected profit of zero. With equal coupon payments in each period, the full information interest factors charged by a lender at t = 0 would be 2/(1 + η) for a type G firm in case of the choice of the safe project and 2/(1 + α) for a type B firm or a type G firm in case of the choice of the risky project.
The competitive full information interest factors that a lender could charge at t = 1 equal 1/η for a type G firm in case of the choice of the safe project, and 1/α otherwise. Throughout the analysis, I assume:
This assumption implies that a type G firm prefers to invest in the safe project with outside financing at the full information interest factor for a safe project, and prefers the risky project if charged the full information interest factor for a risky project. Assumption 1 dictates that
Financial Market Financing
Lenders in the financial market do not invest in information production, and thus can not distinguish between borrower types. As a consequence, they offer firms a pooling interest rate with equal coupon payments in each period. The competitive interest factor r F charged in the case of financial market financing depends on the proportion of type G firms in the economy. If a type G firm chooses the risky project, r F equals:
Denote this contract as financial market contract (i ). If a type G firm chooses the safe project, r F equals:
Denote this contract as financial market contract (ii ). The following result can be derived.
Lemma 1 With financial market contracts, the following equilibria occur:
(a) If θ <θ, both types of firms invest in the risky project, and r F is given by (2). The expected social loss from inefficient investment in this equilibrium is θ(ηY − αX).
(b) If θ ≥θ, a type G firm invests in the safe project and a type B firm invests in the risky project, and r F is given by (3). In this equilibrium, first best investment efficiency occurs.
The cutoff proportionθ is defined in the Appendix.
Assumption 1 ensures thatθ ∈ (0, 1). The intuition is straightforward. If the proportion θ of type G firms in the economy is low (θ <θ), the adverse selection premium in the pooled interest factor r F charged in the financial market is relatively high. Financial market financing then causes asset substitution moral hazard on the side of a type G firm, resulting in a social loss. For higher levels of θ (θ ≥θ), the adverse selection premium in the financial market rate is low, and asset substitution moral hazard is prevented. Observe that, since a type G firm in both cases is pooled with a type B firm, it may seek to be separated from the type B firm, and therefore may prefer to be monitored by a bank.
Bank Financing
A bank which lends to a firm invests in information production (i.e., monitoring) at a cost M ≥ 0 after contracting, and receives a non-verifiable signal with respect to the firm's investment opportunity set at t = 1. Based on this signal, the bank can adjust the second-period interest rate by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm. 10 An important feature of the model is the hold-up problem. That is, since an inside bank can act on non-verifiable information, it may extract rents from the firm in the second period.
The bank's intermediate interest rate decision, and thus the severity of the hold-up problem, is affected by the presence of less informed competitors (either outside banks or lenders in the financial market) at the end of the first period. In the absence of lender competition at t = 1, the firm is locked in to its inside bank, and the inside bank can extract monopolistic rents (dependent on the type of contract offered). When lender competition is present, the inside bank and outside lenders enter into a sequential bidding game, in which outside lenders offer second-period lending terms to the firm, and the inside bank subsequently makes a counteroffer. 11
Observe that, irrespective of the type of bank contract used and the degree of competition at t = 1, the maximum interest factor that an inside bank can charge a type G firm such that it would weakly prefer the safe project equals r * (see equation (1)). As will be verified later, the interest factor that an outside lender would charge at t = 1 in the case of competition equals r + ≡ 1/α. I first consider enforceable bank contracts, and subsequently focus on discretionary bank contracts. Without loss of generality, I make the following assumption:
Assumption 2 The bank's monitoring costs M are small.
This assumption implies that the monitoring costs are sufficiently small to make bank lending with monitoring viable. 12
3.3.A Enforceable Bank Contracts
The terms of enforceable bank contracts are legally binding. An enforceable bank contract therefore does not allow a bank to increase the contractually specified interest rate at t = 1 after observing a signal that a firm is of type B. However, the bank has the option to lower the interest rate for a type G firm in order to prevent asset substitution moral hazard. This increases the success probability of the type G firm's project, and allows the bank to extract ex post rents.
In an ex ante competitive market, the benefits from increased investment efficiency fully accrue to the firm through a reduction in the interest factor charged by the bank. This intertemporal subsidy can be denoted as an investment efficiency effect (see Petersen and Rajan, 1995) .
The precision of the signal received by a bank, and thus its ability to enhance investment efficiency, depends on the bank's quality. Let r E (γ) be the competitive interest factor of an enforceable bank contract offered by a bank with quality γ. A bank then offers firms a contract with equal coupon payments r E (γ) at t = 0 and t = 1, unless it lowers the interest rate at t = 1.
Recall that, due to the non-verifiability of the signal produced by the bank, such an interest rate decrease is non-contractible. However, since firms rationally anticipate an interest rate decrease in equilibrium, it will be reflected in r E (γ). For M sufficiently small, r E (γ) < 1/α. Dependent on the proportion of type G firms in the economy, and the bank's intermediate interest decision, three types of enforceable bank contracts can be distinguished:
(i ) With this contract, the bank charges a firm r E (γ) > r * at t = 0, and lowers the interest factor to r * at t = 1 after observing a signal that the firm is of type G; the bank does not adjust the interest rate otherwise.
(ii ) With this contract, the bank charges a firm r E (γ) > r * at t = 0, and lowers the interest factor to r * at t = 1 after observing a signal that the firm is of type G, or after observing an uninformative signal; the bank does not adjust the interest rate after observing a signal that the firm is of type B.
(iii ) With this contract, the bank charges a firm r E (γ) < r * at t = 0, and does not adjust the interest rate at t = 1, irrespective of the signal received.
The competitive interest factor r E (γ) for each of these contracts follows from the bank's zero profit constraints. For enforceable bank contract (i ), r E (γ) solves:
For enforceable bank contract (ii ), r E (γ) satisfies:
For enforceable bank contract (iii ), r E (γ) equals:
This leads to the following result.
Lemma 2 The equilibria with enforceable bank contracts can be characterized as follows:
(a) If θ < θ M , then a bank charges r E (γ) given by (4), and lowers the interest rate to r * at t = 1 after receiving a good signal. A type G firm invests in the safe project if charged r * , and in the risky project otherwise. A type B firm invests in the risky project. The expected social loss in this equilibrium equals (1 − γ)θ(ηY − αX).
, then a bank charges r E (γ) given by (5), and lowers the interest rate to r * after receiving a good or an uninformative signal. A type G firm always invests in the safe project, and a type B firm invests in the risky project. In this equilibrium, investment efficiency occurs.
(c) If θ ≥θ M , then a bank always charges r E (γ) given by (6). A type G firm always invests in the safe project, and a type B firm invests in the risky project. In this equilibrium, investment efficiency occurs.
The cutoff proportions θ M andθ M >θ are defined in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 describes which enforceable bank contract applies as a function of borrower quality θ.
The intuition is similar to the case of financial market financing. If the proportion of type G firms in the economy is low (θ <θ M ), the adverse selection premium in the pooled interest factor r E (γ) with enforceable bank financing is high, which causes asset substitution moral hazard.
A bank can then restore investment efficiency by lowering the interest rate for a type G firm sufficiently to induce the firm to invest in the safe project, and extract rents. If the proportion of type G firms is very low (θ < θ M ), then the expected benefits from investment efficiency are small. A bank then only lowers the interest rate after observing a perfect signal that a firm is of type G. If the quality of the borrower pool is slightly better (θ M ≤ θ <θ M ), the expected benefits from investment efficiency become more significant. A bank then also lowers the interest rate after observing an uninformative signal, and asset substitution moral hazard is completely eliminated. For higher levels of θ (θ ≥θ M ), the pooled interest factor with enforceable bank financing is low. In this case, investment efficiency obtains without downward adjustments in the interest rate.
3.3.B Discretionary Bank Contracts
Contrary to enforceable bank contracts, discretionary bank contracts do not prespecify the contract terms for the second period, but instead leave the bank discretion in adapting the second-period interest rate to soft information obtained from monitoring. A discretionary contract thus allows a bank to better discriminate between borrowers. The bank can increase the interest rate after observing a signal that a firm is of type B, whereas it can charge a lower interest rate to a type G firm in order to prevent asset substitution moral hazard. As a consequence, discretionary contracts can not only enhance investment efficiency (investment efficiency effect), but in addition can redistribute wealth from type B to type G firms. The latter (cross-sectional) effect can be denoted as a wealth redistribution effect. In an ex ante competitive market, both effects translate in an intertemporal subsidy through a lower first-period interest rate.
Observe, however, that discretionary contracts increase the bank's ability to extract rents from borrowers at t = 1 relative to enforceable contracts, and thus worsen the hold-up problem.
In the absence of lender competition at t = 1, the hold-up problem is substantial, as indicated in the following result.
Lemma 3 (No Competition) If lender competition is absent, a bank always charges X at t = 1 with discretionary bank financing, and both types of firms invest in the risky project. The expected social loss from inefficient investment equals θ(ηY − αX).
The intuition is that without competition, discretionary contracts leave a firm fully unprotected against large interest rate increases. That is, the ability of the bank to extract rents is so high that it is not worthwhile to bring down interest rates to enhance investment efficiency. The bank now extracts maximum (monopolistic) rents from the firm in the second period, irrespective of the signal received at t = 1, resulting in inefficient investment.
Let r D (γ) be the competitive first-period interest factor of a discretionary contract charged by a bank with quality γ. A bank then offers firms a contract with an interest factor r D (γ) at t = 0, and reserves the right to unilaterally determine the second-period interest rate at t = 1.
In the absence of interim lender competition, r D (γ) equals:
When interim competition is present, outside lenders compete with the inside bank by offering a (short-term) contract to the firm at the end of the first period. Lender competition at t = 1 is modeled as a sequential bidding game, in which an outside lender first offers a second-period interest rate to a firm, and the inside bank subsequently makes a counteroffer. Outside lenders are now at a competitive disadvantage due to the lemon's problem. That is, since an inside bank has an informational advantage, it can always undercut an outside lender's offer after receiving a perfectly informative signal that a firm is of type G and after receiving an uninformative signal.
An outside lender then can only attract type B firms, and as a consequence always offers the full information factor r + = 1/α for a type B firm at t = 1. In this case, firms will not switch from the inside bank to the outside lender. The following result can now be derived.
Lemma 4 (Competition)
In the presence of lender competition, the following equilibria occur with discretionary bank contracts:
(a) If θ <θ, then a bank charges r * at t = 1 after receiving a good signal, and r + otherwise. A type G firm invests in the safe project if charged r * , and in the risky project otherwise. A type B firm invests in the risky project. The expected social loss in this equilibrium equals (1 − γ)θ(ηY − αX).
(b) If θ ≥θ, then a bank charges r * after receiving a good or an uninformative signal, and r + otherwise. A type G firm always invests in the safe project, and a type B firm invests in the risky project. In this equilibrium, investment efficiency occurs.
The cutoff proportionθ >θ is defined in the Appendix.
Assumption 1 guarantees thatθ ∈ (0, 1). Lemma 4 shows that lender competition cannot eliminate the hold-up problem with discretionary bank contracts, since firms remain informationally captured. However, competition is important, since it curbs the inside bank's ability to extract ex post rents. Outside lenders can now always offer firms the worst possible lending terms (i.e., the full information interest factor r + for a type B firm), which imposes a boundary on the inside bank's discretion. This mitigates the hold-up problem. 13 Since the possibilities for rent extraction are limited by competition, the inside bank may now be willing to charge even lower interest rates to facilitate investment efficiency. If the proportion of type G firms in the economy is not too high (θ <θ), then the expected benefits of investment efficiency are small relative to those from hold-up, and the inside bank only charges a lower interest rate after receiving a perfect signal that a firm is of type G. For high levels of θ (θ ≥θ), on the other hand, the reverse holds. The bank then also brings down the interest rate after receiving an uninformative signal, and investment efficiency always occurs.
13 Note that this observation is robust to the sequencing of the bidding game between the inside bank and the outside lender, i.e., does not depend on whether the outside lender and the inside bank make offers sequentially or simultaneously at t = 1. For firms with θ <θ, the latter case results in an identical pure strategy equilibrium. For firms with θ ≥θ, it generates a mixed strategy equilibrium, in which lenders randomize over the interval [1/[θη + (1 − θ)α], r * ] ∪ {r + } in setting the second-period interest rate. In this equilibrium, there is selective undercutting and limited informational capture of borrowers in bank-firm relationships, with interest rates charged above market rates and occasional switching of borrowers (see also Rajan, 1992 , Broecker, 1998 , Hauswald and Marquez, 2001 , and Von Thadden, 2002 . It can be shown that simultaneous bidding would further reduce the hold-up problem for type G firms, and thus would strengthen the results in the remainder of the paper.
For firms with an observable quality θ <θ, the competitive interest factor r D (γ) with discretionary bank financing in the presence of lender competition satisfies:
This contract can be denoted as discretionary bank contract (i ). For firms with θ ≥θ, r D (γ) solves:
This contract can be denoted as discretionary bank contract (ii ).
The Firm's Choice of Contract Type and Funding Source
The analysis in the previous section determined the contract terms for each of the financing alternatives available to firms at t = 0. I now consider the overall game, and examine the firm's choice of contract type and funding source at this date. Each firm chooses the contract that maximizes its expected payoff, which equals the expected return on the project net of borrowing costs. Define R F j (i) and R F j (ii) as a type j firm's expected payoff in the case of financial market financing with contract (i ) and (ii ), with j ∈ {B, G}. Furthermore, let R E j (i, γ), R E j (ii, γ), R E j (iii, γ), and R D j (i, γ) and R D j (ii, γ) be a type j firm's expected payoff as a function of the bank's quality γ in the case of financing with enforceable bank contracts (i ) through (iii ) and discretionary bank contract (i ) and (ii ), respectively. In order to derive the main results of the paper, I distinguish three intervals with respect to the quality of the borrower pool in the economy: a low quality borrower pool consisting of firms with an observable quality θ ∈ [0,θ), a medium quality borrower pool with θ ∈ [θ,θ), and a high quality borrower pool with θ ∈ [θ, 1]. Table 2 gives an overview of each type of firm's expected payoff as a function of its contract and funding source choice for those contracts that are relevant for the remainder of the analysis. I focus on Bayesian Perfect Nash Equilibria (BPNE).
Equilibria with Enforceable Bank Contracts
I first compare financial market financing and bank financing with enforceable contracts. The following result can immediately be derived.
Lemma 5
This result is intuitive. If monitoring costs are positive, enforceable bank contracts are dominated by financial market contracts, unless they improve investment efficiency. If the quality of the borrower pool is sufficiently high (θ ≥θ), then financial market financing results in efficient investment (see Lemma 1). Bank financing then does not add value, while it incurs monitoring costs. If the quality of the borrower pool is low (θ <θ), then financial market financing induces asset substitution moral hazard. In this case, enforceable bank contracts can be valuable, since they enhance investment efficiency.
Whether low quality borrowers prefer enforceable bank financing over financial market financing depends on the bank's quality γ, as shown in the following results.
Proposition 1 For a low quality borrower pool, the following holds:
(a) If θ < θ M , both types of firms prefer enforceable bank financing over financial market financing in a Pareto optimal pooling BPNE if the bank's quality is sufficiently high (i.e., if γ ≥ γ E ). Otherwise, both types of firms prefer financial market financing. Furthermore,
, both types of firms always prefer enforceable bank financing over financial market financing in a Pareto optimal pooling BPNE.
There are no separating equilibria on θ ∈ [0,θ). The cutoff level γ E is defined in the Appendix.
Corollary 1 If M > 0, the very lowest quality firms prefer financial market financing.
The intuition is as follows. Firms prefer enforceable bank financing over financial market financing if the expected benefits from increased investment efficiency with bank financing (through a lower interest factor r E (γ)) more than offset the monitoring costs. Since both types of firms share the surplus from increased investment efficiency, bank financing then is Pareto optimal.
The investment efficiency effect in r E (γ) increases with both borrower quality and bank quality. For very low quality borrowers (θ < θ M ), the investment efficiency effect is small, and a bank improves investment efficiency after receiving a perfect signal that a firm is of type G (see Lemma 2). Both types of firms then prefer enforceable bank financing if the bank's quality is sufficiently high (γ ≥ γ E ). The cutoff level γ E increases if borrower quality decreases. In the limit (θ ↓ 0), the investment efficiency effect becomes negligible, and firms always choose financial market financing if monitoring costs are positive (see Corollary 1). For slightly higher quality borrowers (θ M ≤ θ <θ), the investment efficiency effect is larger, and a bank always improves investment efficiency (see Lemma 2). In this case, both types of firms are always better off with enforceable bank financing.
Lemma 5 and Proposition 1 imply that only low quality borrowers choose bank financing, whereas medium and high quality borrowers seek funding in the financial market. That is, in the case of enforceable bank contracts, the benefits of bank financing are confined to lower quality firms. This result is consistent with predictions in, e.g., Diamond (1991) , Berlin and Mester (1992) and Rajan (1992) .
Equilibria with Discretionary Bank Contracts
I next consider the equilibria in the overall game when discretionary bank contracts are possible.
First, consider the case without lender competition at t = 1. The following result then holds.
Lemma 6 (No Competition)
If lender competition is absent, discretionary bank contracts can not compete with financial market contracts or enforceable bank contracts.
This result states that firms never choose discretionary bank contracts when interim competition is absent. The reason is that without competition, the hold-up problem with discretionary bank contracts is so severe that a bank would always extract maximum rents from the firm in the second period (see Lemma 4). This precludes investment efficiency as well as a wealth redistribution from type B to type G firms. Discretionary bank contracts therefore do not add any value, and are dominated by financial market contracts and enforceable bank contracts.
Lemma 6 shows that lender competition is necessary for the viability of discretionary bank financing. In the presence of lender competition at t = 1, the following results can be derived.
Proposition 2 (Competition) The firm's funding source choice in the presence of lender competition can be characterized as follows:
(a) If the quality of the borrower pool is low (θ <θ), both types of firms prefer discretionary bank financing over financial market financing in a Pareto optimal BPNE if the bank's quality γ ≥ γ D > γ E . Furthermore,
Although a type B firm's expected payoff with discretionary bank financing is lower than with enforceable bank financing, a type B firm also chooses discretionary bank financing.
(b) If the quality of the borrower pool is medium (θ ∈ [θ,θ)) or high (θ ≥θ), then a type G firm prefers discretionary bank financing over financial market financing if γ ≥ γ M and γ ≥ γ H , respectively. Furthermore, ∂γ H ∂θ > 0. Although a type B firm's expected payoff with discretionary bank financing is lower than with financial market financing, the type B firm also chooses discretionary bank financing.
All the pooling BPNE with discretionary bank financing are universally divine (see Banks and Sobel, 1987 ) . There are no separating equilibria. The cutoff levels γ D , γ L , γ M and γ H are defined in the Appendix.
Corollary 2 If M > 0, both the very lowest and the very highest quality firms prefer financial market financing.
Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. Since discretionary contracts allow banks to better discriminate between borrowers in setting the second-period interest rate, these contracts are particularly attractive for type G firms. With a discretionary contract, a type G firm can benefit from increased investment efficiency as well as a wealth redistribution effect (both are captured through a lower first-period interest factor r D (γ)). However, by choosing a discretionary contract, a type G firm exposes itself to a potentially large hold-up problem. A type G firm then prefers discretionary bank financing over financial market financing and enforceable bank financing if the investment efficiency effect and/or the wealth redistribution effect in r D (γ) are sufficiently large relative to the monitoring costs, and the hold-up problem is small. In the presence of lender competition, both the investment efficiency effect and the wealth redistribution effect increase with bank quality, whereas the hold-up problem decreases with bank quality.
Discretionary bank financing therefore is optimal if the bank's quality γ is sufficiently high.
Since the wealth redistribution with discretionary bank contracts occurs at the expense of type B firms, a type B firm will never prefer discretionary bank financing over enforceable bank financing, but may prefer discretionary bank financing over financial market financing if the investment efficiency effect in r D (γ) is sufficiently large relative to the monitoring costs (i.e., if γ is sufficiently high), and the hold-up problem is not too large. Irrespective of this, a type B firm has no option other than to mimic a type G firm's contract choice in a pooling equilibrium, because it would otherwise unambiguously be identified as a type B firm and charged the worst possible lending terms (i.e., the full information interest factor r + for a type B firm). Now first consider a low quality borrower pool (θ <θ). For these borrowers, financial market financing results in inefficient investment. Although the investment efficiency effect with discretionary bank financing in this case is small relative to the hold-up problem, a bank will improve investment efficiency after receiving a perfect signal that a firm is of type G (see Lemma 5). Both types of firms then share the surplus from increased investment efficiency, and prefer discretionary bank financing over financial market financing if the bank's quality is sufficiently high (i.e., γ ≥ γ D ). Observe that, due to the larger hold-up problem with discretionary bank financing relative to enforceable bank financing, γ D > γ E (see Proposition 1). Since the investment efficiency effect increases with borrower quality, the cutoff level γ D increases if borrower quality decreases. In the limit (θ ↓ 0), the investment efficiency effect becomes negligible, and firms always choose financial market financing if monitoring costs are positive (see Corollary 2).
For very low quality borrowers (θ < θ M ), enforceable bank contracts and discretionary bank contracts yield a similar investment efficiency effect. A type G firm then prefers discretionary bank financing due to the incremental wealth redistribution effect. For slightly higher quality borrowers (θ M ≤ θ <θ), enforceable bank contracts dominate discretionary bank contracts in terms of investment efficiency. A type G firm then still prefers discretionary bank financing if the wealth redistribution effect with such contracts is large enough to compensate the firm for the relative loss in investment efficiency (i.e., if γ ≥ γ L ).
Next, consider a medium quality borrower pool (θ ≤ θ <θ). In this case, financial market financing generates investment efficiency. Since the hold-up problem for these borrowers is still large, discretionary bank financing only results in investment efficiency after the bank receives a perfect signal that a firm is of type G. Because discretionary bank contracts now perform worse than financial market contracts in terms of investment efficiency, a type G firm only chooses discretionary bank financing if the wealth distribution effect is sufficiently large to compensate the firm for the loss in investment efficiency (i.e., if γ ≥ γ M ).
Finally, consider a high quality borrower pool (θ ≥θ). In this case, the hold-up problem with discretionary bank financing is small relative to the investment efficiency effect, and financial market financing and discretionary bank financing both result in investment efficiency (see Lemma 4). A type G firm then can still benefit from the incremental wealth redistribution effect with discretionary bank financing if bank quality is sufficiently high (i.e., if γ ≥ γ H ). Since the wealth redistribution effect decreases if θ increases, the cutoff level γ H increases with borrower quality. In the limit (θ ↑ 1), the wealth redistribution effect becomes negligible, and firms always prefer financial market financing if monitoring costs are positive (Corollary 2).
The implications of the use of discretionary bank contracts for the competitive position of banks are summarized in the following result.
Proposition 3 Discretionary bank contracts increase banks' market share vis-à-vis financial markets in the presence of lender competition.
This result is straightforward. Without discretionary contracts, only low quality firms choose bank financing. By offering discretionary contracts, banks can also attract firms in a medium and high quality borrower pool. Observe, however, that this requires a minimum bank quality (see Proposition 2). That is, in the presence of competition, only higher quality banks can draw borrowers away from financial market financing.
Discussion
The main insights from the Propositions 1 through 3 are summarized in Table 3. The table shows that when interim lender competition is present, the relative importance of bank financing visa-vis financial market financing is non-monotonic in borrower quality. The key in explaining this is the hold-up problem, which varies with contract type, borrower quality and bank quality.
If the quality of the borrower pool is low (θ <θ), then financial market financing prevents investment efficiency. Bank financing can then be optimal, because it facilitates investment efficiency. Given sufficient lender competition (and thus a relatively small hold-up problem) and a sufficiently high bank quality, bank financing takes the form of discretionary contracts, and also results in a wealth redistribution. Otherwise, enforceable bank contracts are optimal, since they strike a better balance between investment efficiency and a smaller hold-up problem. 14 For a medium quality borrower pool (θ ≤ θ <θ), financial market financing results in investment efficiency. Enforceable bank contracts then can not do better, whereas the hold-up problem with discretionary bank financing may reduce investment efficiency. Provided that lender competition is present, bank financing then will only be preferred if the wealth redistribution associated with discretionary bank contracts substantially favors borrowers with good investment opportunities, i.e., if bank quality is relatively high.
If the quality of the borrower pool is high (θ ≥θ), then the hold-up problem with discretionary bank financing is small, and banks will always aim at investment efficiency. Financial market financing then can not do better, except if the bank's quality is low. In this case, the benefits of wealth redistribution with discretionary bank contracts are not sufficient to cover the monitoring costs of bank financing.
Bank financing thus is most attractive for firms in either a low or a high quality borrower pool. If the quality of the borrower pool is low, bank financing improves investment efficiency and, with discretionary contracts, may also result in a significant wealth redistribution in favor of type G firms. For high quality borrowers, bank financing can not increase investment efficiency.
However, high quality firms may still benefit from a wealth redistribution with discretionary 14 Observe that the hold-up problem with enforceable bank contracts is small (and is furthermore insensitive to interim lender competition), since the firm is protected by enforceable contract terms.
contracts. For medium quality borrowers, discretionary bank contracts are less attractive. For these borrowers, bank financing reduces investment efficiency relative to financial market financing. Since firms need to be compensated for this loss in investment efficiency, they will only choose bank financing if the wealth redistribution effect is sufficiently large.
Numerical Example
The main results of the model can be illustrated with a numerical example, based on the following parameters: η = also Table 3 ). Bank financing is optimal for low quality borrowers (θ < 0.1667), but can also be optimal if the quality of the borrower pool is high (θ ≥ 0.8333). If the borrower pool is of medium quality, financial market financing may become more attractive. Observe that for the very worst (θ ↓ 0) and the very best (θ ↑ 1) borrowers, bank financing can only compete with financial market financing if monitoring costs are zero (see Panel A). While these limiting cases are of interest in themselves, real-world borrowers are generally characterized by less extreme values of θ. If M increases, the lower bound of the D region for the high and low quality borrower pool shifts to the center. This shrinks the D region, in particular for low and high quality borrowers. Finally, note that in the absence of discretionary bank contracts and/or in the absence of interim lender competition, the D region in both panels of the figure is replaced with the E region if the quality of the borrower pool is low, and with the F region if the quality of the borrower pool is medium or high. In this case, (enforceable) bank financing is only attractive if the quality of the borrower pool is low.
Extensions and Further Implications
In this section, I discuss potential extensions of the basic model and address further implications of the analysis.
Short-Term versus Long-Term Financial Contracts
The analysis so far has focused on long-term (two-period) financial market contracts and longterm (renegotiable) bank contracts. This section examines how the results would be affected if firms can choose between short-term and long-term bank and financial market contracts.
Observe that in the case of short-term bank financing, the distinction between enforceable and discretionary contracts disappears, since a bank can adjust the interest rate in either direction upon renewal of the loan.
Several papers have argued that a firm's debt maturity choice can serve as a signalling device;
i.e., firms with good investment opportunities can signal their quality by taking on and repaying short-term debt (see, e.g., Diamond, 1993, and Rajan, 1995) . In the context of the model presented in this paper, such a signalling mechanism would only be feasible if an (outside) lender can infer information with respect to a firm's investment opportunity set from its firstperiod repayment behavior (i.e., if the soft information is sufficiently correlated with the firm's first-period cash flow). 15 However, even in this case, a type G firm will prefer long-term bank financing over short-term bank or financial market financing if the bank's quality is sufficiently high, and the results of the previous section will continue to hold. 16 The reason is that since short-term contracts need to break even on a period by period basis, they provide no possibility for the bank and the firm to intertemporally share surplus. Long-term bank contracts allow for intertemporal subsidies and a potential wealth redistribution effect. This is attractive for a type G firm. Observe that a type B firm again has no option other than to mimic a type G firm's contract choice in a pooling equilibrium. The benefits of long-term discretionary contracts, therefore, can not be mimicked by short-term contracts. This result is consistent with the insight from the contracting literature that in long-term relationships under asymmetric information, sequences of short-term contracts can implement strictly less than long-term contracts (see also Townsend, 1982 , Fudenberg et al., 1990 , Rey and Salanié, 1990 , and Von Thadden, 1995 .
Ex Ante Incentives, Project Types and Contract Choice
The basic model in Section 2 incorporated an ex post investment decision on the side of the borrower at t = 1. However, the financing alternatives may also differ with respect to their effect on the borrower's ex ante investment incentives. How would the results be affected if such ex ante incentives are considered?
In order to explore this, I assume that a borrower makes a privately costly and unobservable effort decision at t = 0, which increases the expected first and second-period cash flows of the efficient project through a higher probability of success. The analysis then suggests that discretionary bank contracts result in better ex ante effort incentives than either enforceable bank contracts or financial market contracts. The intuition is that the lower ex ante interest rate with a discretionary contract increases the borrower's marginal return to effort relative to other contracts. Although this effect might be (partially) offset by a higher second-period interest rate, a borrower may choose a higher ex ante effort level with a discretionary bank contract.
While an improvement in ex ante effort incentives can be attractive for safer (i.e., more conservative) projects, it may be even more important for riskier projects. This could, for example, be the case for firms with innovative, R&D-type investments. For such firms (which typically have low θ's and potentially valuable risky projects), a sufficiently high level of ex ante firm-specific effort is generally crucial for long-term success. This implies that the use of discretionary contracts may stimulate innovative investments in the economy. The intuition is that the lower ex ante interest rate with discretionary bank contracts resuls in higher ex ante firm-specific effort than any of the other contracts. This may tilt the value of promising risky projects above the value of more conservative project choices, and thus makes innovative projects attractive. This result emphasizes the incremental value of discretionary bank contracts relative to enforceable contracts. Enforceable bank contracts can enhance ex post efficiency with respect to a firm's project risk choice, but cannot ensure ex ante efficiency. Discretionary contracts augment the benefits of ex post investment efficiency with improved ex ante incentives, and thus may be superior. Observe that an explicit consideration of ex ante incentives strengthens the dominance of long-term contracts over short-term contracts in the model (see Section 5.1), i.e., short-term contracts cannot improve a borrower's ex ante incentives as much as long-term discretionary contracts. This result is in line with Mester (1992) and Von Thadden (1995) . 17 These considerations make it possible to relate a firm's choice of contract type and funding source (and thus the 'implied' interest rate structure that the firm faces over time) to the type of its investment projects. The theory developed in this paper therefore proposes a (tentative) typology of the financing sources of firms, based on the relative importance (and trade-off) between ex ante and ex post investment incentives.
Comparative Financial Systems
The analysis also has implications for financial system design (see, e.g., Allen and Gale, 2000) . In particular, it provides a link between the intrinsic quality of banks as information producers (or more generally, the quality γ of the 'banking system'), the level of competition in the financial sector, and the way firms are financed in an economy.
If the quality of the banking system in an economy is low, then banks will not be able to optimally utilize flexibility in their contracts. In this case, the use of discretionary contracts may result in incorrect interest rate adjustments, which may distort both ex ante and ex post investment incentives on the side of borrowing firms. A lack of competition furthermore may create hold-up problems. It can therefore be expected that bank-firm relationships in lower quality (i.e., less developed) banking systems are more rigid, and are characterized by the use of enforceable bank contracts. Such contracts protect firms against excessive rent extraction and mitigate moral hazard.
Discretionary contracts would predominantly be observed in economies with well-developed banking systems and a high degree of competition in the financial sector. In such economies, the analysis predicts a larger role for more reputable banks in the financing of higher quality firms, as well as more innovative investments. This is consistent with empirical findings in, e.g., Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) .
Bank Mergers and Organizational Structure
The recent consolidation trend in the banking industry could be at odds with the effective use of discretionary contracts by banks. To the extent that consolidation increases a bank's market power, hold-up problems may increase. But even if consolidation does not reduce interbank competition, consolidation in itself may undermine the incentives of banks to produce and utilize soft information. In particular, recent research has shown that large banks are less market, and can improve ex ante incentives. Borrowers with good investment opportunities thus may still prefer bank financing if the bank's quality is sufficiently high.
capable in using soft information (see Udell, 2002, and Stein, 2002 , and for empirical evidence Berger et al., 2001) . This could adversely affect the availability of financing for small and informationally opaque firms, for which loan approval decisions are largely based on nonverifiable information. Credit approval decisions in larger banks tend to be based on harder (i.e., verifiable) borrower information relative to smaller banks.
Consistent with this conjecture, several recent papers have analyzed the impact of the bank consolidation on the price and availability of credit to borrowers, and find that mergers involving at least one large bank result in a lower supply of loans to small borrowers by the merged entity (see Sapienza, 2002) . The actual supply of loans may not go down, because such mergers invite entry of de novo banks that specialize in small business financing (see Berger et al., 1998) .
These observations suggest that an effective use of contractual discretion has implications for the internal organization and optimal organizational structure of banks. In particular, it points at the benefits of smaller banks in processing soft information and/or the optimality of decentralized decision-making at the level of the loan officers, such that soft information is used (see Stein, 2002) .
Conclusions
The particular focus of this paper has been on the value of soft information, which provides a rationale for the use of contractual discretion in bank-firm relationships. Discretionary contracts may enhance investment efficiency on the side of firms and facilitate wealth redistributions in favor of firms with good investment opportunities, but -on the negative side -may create substantial hold-up problems.
The analysis has shown that the value of discretion depends critically on both bank quality and the degree of interim lender competition. A key result is that competition mitigates the hold-up problem, and thus facilitates discretionary contracts. In the presence of competition, borrowers then substitute discretionary bank contracts for enforceable bank contracts or financial market financing if the bank's quality as an information producer is sufficiently high.
Since both the benefits of discretion and the severity of the hold-up problem vary with borrower quality, the relative importance of bank financing vis-à-vis financial market financing is non-monotonic in borrower quality. I show that bank financing is optimal for lower quality borrowers, particularly because it facilitates investment efficiency, and given sufficient lender competition (and, thus a small hold-up problem), also can redistribute wealth. However, bank financing can also be optimal for high quality borrowers, provided that competition contains the hold-up problem. In this case, the wealth redistribution effect gives a distinct benefit to the high quality firm. For medium quality borrowers, financial market financing generally dominates.
Although bank financing in this case redistributes wealth, it reduces investment efficiency relative to the financial market. These conclusions differ from earlier work, and suggest a larger role for banks in the financing of higher quality firms when soft information is important.
The issues discussed in this paper emphasize the value of bank-firm relationships, and imply that relationship lending may continue to be optimal when competition in the financial sector increases. I have argued that other factors may be important as well. In particular, the consolidation trend in the financial services industry may hamper banks' ability to use soft information effectively. In future work, the issues addressed in this paper should therefore be linked to the optimal organizational structure of financial institutions.
rate decision at t = 1 is an optimal response to both types of firms' project decisions, and vice versa. Given both firm types' project choices, a bank charges X at t = 1 after receiving a good, a bad or an uninformative signal if αX > ηr * , i.e., if X > η 2 Y α(2η−α) > r * . Both types of firms then choose the risky project, and the expected social loss equals θ(ηY − αX). 2
Proof of Lemma 4: Letθ ≡ 1−αr * (η−α)r * >θ. The conjectured equilibria are Nash equilibria if, given the outside lender's bidding strategy r + = 1/α at t = 1, the inside bank's intermediate interest rate decision is an optimal response to both types of firms' project choices, and vice versa. An inside bank charges r * after receiving a good signal if ηr * > αr + , i.e., if r * > 1/η (see Assumption 1). The bank charges r + after receiving a bad signal. The inside bank charges r + after receiving an uninformative signal if [θη + (1 − θ)α]r * < αr + , i.e., if θ <θ. In this equilibrium, the expected social loss equals (1 − γ)θ(ηY − αX). If θ ≥θ, the bank charges r * after receiving an uninformative signal. In this equilibrium, investment efficiency occurs. 2
Proof of Lemma 5: Enforceable bank contract (iii ) can be offered to firms with θ ≥θ M ≥θ.
On this interval, a type G firm chooses the safe project with enforceable bank contract (iii ) and with financial market contract (ii ). Since r E (γ) ≥ r F for M ≥ 0 (see equations (3) and (6) For θ ∈ [θ,θ M ), a type G firm chooses the safe project with enforceable bank contract (ii ) and financial market contract (ii ). Since r E (γ) > r * ≥ r F for M > 0 (see (3) and (5)), financial market financing then dominates. If θ ∈ [θ M ,θ), a type G firm would invest in the safe project with enforceable bank contract (ii ), and in the risky project with financial market contract (i ).
Both types of firms then trade off an increase in investment efficiency with the higher costs of bank financing. Enforceable bank contract (i ) can be offered to firms with θ < θ M . For M ≥M and θ ∈ [θ, θ M ), a type G firm always chooses the safe project with financial market contract (ii ), whereas with enforceable bank financing it chooses the safe project with a probability γ. Since in this case r E (γ) > r * ≥ r F (see (3) and (4)), financial market financing dominates for both types of firms. If M <M and θ < θ M , a type G firm chooses the safe project with a probability γ with enforceable bank contract (i ), and the risky project with financial market contract (i ).
Both types of firms then again trade off the benefits of increased investment efficiency with the higher costs of bank financing. 2
Proof of Proposition
. Furthermore, let M <M , such that θ M <θ, and enforceable bank contract (ii ) can be offered to firms with θ ∈ [θ M ,θ). First, it can be shown that there exists a pooling BPNE in which both types of firms choose financial market contract (i ) on [0,θ), and r F is given by (2). This equilibrium is sustained by the posterior probability assessment µ that a firm which deviates by either choosing no contract or enforceable bank financing is of type B with a probability 1, i.e., µ(B|k) = 1 with k ∈ {no contract, E(i), E(ii)}. A bank's best response BR(k, µ) to an out of equilibrium (o.o.e.) move k ∈ {E(i), E(ii)} then is to charge an interest factor (2 + M )/(1 + α), in which case neither type of firm would wish to defect from its equilibrium strategy for M > 0. Since choosing no contract yields both types of firms a zero expected payoff, this is a dominated strategy which will be ignored in the rest of the analysis. Second, it can be shown that there exists a pooling BPNE in which both types of firms choose enforceable bank contract (i ) on [0, θ M ), and r E (γ) is given by (4), if the bank's quality γ ≥ γ E . This equilibrium is sustained by the posterior probability assessment µ(B|F (i)) = 1, with BR(F (i), µ) = 2/(1 + α). A type B firm then prefers enforce-
≡ M <M . In this case, a type G firm prefers enforceable contract (i ) as well. If γ < γ E or M > M , the equilibrium with enforceable bank contract (i ) is not feasible. Similarly, it can be verified that there exists a pooling BPNE in which both types of firms choose enforceable bank contract (ii ) on [θ M ,θ), and r E (γ) is given by (5). This equilibrium is also sustained by µ(B|F (i)) = 1. A type G firm then prefers enforceable bank
, then the BPNE with enforceable bank contract (ii ) is not feasible. Since the pooling interest factor r F of financial market contract (i ) equals the full information interest rate for a type B firm, it can easily be seen that both types of firms would prefer the BPNE with enforceable bank contract (i ) and (ii ), respectively, over the BPNE with financial market contract (i ) if they exist, i.e., Proof of Proposition 2:
First, it can be shown that there exists a pooling BPNE in which both types of firms choose discretionary bank contract (i ) on [0,θ), and A lender's BR(k, µ) then would be to charge the full information interest factor for a type B firm (in the case of bank financing marked up with M ≥ 0), in which case neither type of firm would wish to defect from its equilibrium strategy. Now first consider borrowers with θ ∈ [0,θ).
A type G firm prefers the BPNE with discretionary bank contract (i ) over the BPNE with financial market contract (i ) if R D G (i, γ) ≥ R F G (i), i.e., if r D (γ) + γαr * + (1 − γ)αr + ≤ (1 + α)r F , with r D (γ) and r F given in (8) and (2). This condition is satisfied for all γ ≥ γ D . Since in this case R D B (i, γ) ≥ R F B (i), a type B firm then prefers discretionary bank contract (i ) as well (Pareto-optimality). A type G firm prefers the BPNE with discretionary bank contract (ii), a type B firm then chooses discretionary bank financing as well. It can easily be verified that the pooling BPNE with discretionary bank financing satisfy the Intuitive Criterion of Cho-Kreps (1987) , since for any relevant o.o.e. move k ∈ {F (i), F (ii), E(i), E(ii)} neither type of firm can be ruled out as a potential defector. In order to proof that the equilibria satisfy the Universal Divinity refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987) , I proceed as follows. Let D j (k) be the set of a lender's best responses r ∈ R ≡ [ 2 1+η , r * ] ∪ { 2 1+α } for which a type j firm would wish to defect from its equilibrium strategy with o.o.e. move k, and let D 0 j (k) be the set of best responses for which a type j firm would be indifferent between defecting and not defecting, with j ∈ {B, G}. It is then sufficient to proof that D G (k) ∪ D 0 G (k) ⊆ D B (k) for all k ∈ {F (i), F (ii), E(i), E(ii)} and for all relevant γ ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, a lender must rule out 
